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Galvin: Commentary

COMMENTARY

COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING THE “PERFECT STORM” HURRICANE
IRMA AND THE ENSUING NATURAL DISASTERS DURING SEPTEMBER 2017
WITHIN REGION 9, MARINE CORPS EMBASSY SECURITY GROUP

Joseph E. Galvin

In September 2017, the Caribbean basin and the state of Florida encountered
Hurricane Irma—the most powerful and potentially the most devastating storm
to impact the region since recordings began. This category 5 hurricane formed
in the southern part of the North Atlantic Ocean and traversed to the Leeward
Islands, smashing into Antigua, Barbuda, Saint Martin, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, leaving them in a major state of peril. All the while, the forecasted path of
the eye of the storm directly targeted the metropolitan centers of Miami and Fort
Lauderdale, the latter the home of Region 9 Headquarters (HQ), Marine Corps
Embassy Security Group (MCESG). The hurricane continued on its path, grazing
Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, fortunately sparing their people
major desolation and their infrastructure major damage, but still wreaking havoc
on those nations. The hurricane then slammed into the northern beaches of
Cuba, where the U.S. embassy is situated. As Irma bounced off Cuba, the eye of
the hurricane changed its projected track, shifting to bring the brunt of the storm
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spawned numerous confirmed tornadoes throughout mainland Florida. Adding
to the mix, during the height of hurricane command operations, Mexico experienced an earthquake measuring 8.1 on the Richter scale—breaking a centuryold record—that triggered emergency reactions from Detachment Mexico City.1
This earthquake brought threats of tsunamis off the coasts of Mexico, El Salvador, and Guatemala, causing detachments there to consider emergency actions.
Furthermore, during the aftermath, Detachment Havana experienced major
flooding of the chancery that affected operational abilities and administrative
routines. A pseudothreat of fire even challenged Region 9 HQ’s displaced operations center—a fire alarm forced evacuation for a period.
This lays out the situation that Region 9, MCESG—the command element for
all the Marine security guards (MSGs) for embassies in the Caribbean, Central
America, and Canada—was charged with controlling. As the regional headquarters for the Caribbean MSG detachments in the embassies in Cuba, Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, Barbados, Jamaica, and the Bahamas, Region 9 HQ ensures
that assigned Marines are trained to coordinate with and follow the operational
and emergency-action plans laid out by the regional security officer (RSO) for
hurricanes and their aftermath. Additionally, the Region 9 HQ staff maintains
direct administrative control over these detachments to ensure completion of all
training and manpower matters.
C2 within the Region 9 HQ staff and with the MSG detachments during Hurricane Irma focused on safety, communication, and accountability.
Safety
Safety was the theme—the main focus of effort—during Hurricane Irma. The
number one command priority in a natural disaster, especially one as potentially
devastating and unpredictable as a category 5 hurricane, is the safety of Marines
and their families. No loss of material possessions, missed work time, or personal
inconvenience can trump a well-contemplated decision that offers safety from
death or serious injury. Decisions involving safety are made continuously and
courses of action may be adapted or otherwise change, depending on the path
of the hurricane and the trail of destruction it leaves. Safety is the priority not
only during preparations and the actual weathering of the hurricane but also,
and perhaps most importantly, during the cleanup phase, as this is when people
are most likely to let their guard down, leading to accidents. A combination of
full-blown and speedier operational risk management (ORM) plans provides
outstanding assessments of courses of action contemplated during hurricane
phases. Understanding the potential safety issues that hurricanes bring and how
they can affect the well-being of Marines is crucial to exercising command with
safety as a priority.
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During preparation, Region 9 HQ coordinated with the potentially affected
detachments and the respective RSOs to determine whether additional support
from the Marine Security Augmentation Unit (MSAU) at MCESG would be required. In two cases, those of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, such support
was requested and provided. MSAU Marines arrived in those countries to assist
with any safety and operational matters the RSOs deemed necessary. This support provided extra MSGs to protect the embassies’ compounds, add manpower
to the detachments, and respond to operational incidents, thereby providing an
extra layer of safety and security to the embassies. Region 9 HQ continuously
preached safety to the detachments during the successive hurricane phases. Understanding the ORM for each plan of action and communicating that concept
to every Marine were crucial to success in the campaign against Hurricane Irma.
Region 9 HQ employed another calculated safety measure by issuing a departure order for the HQ staff to evacuate southern Florida and put the continuity
of operations plan (COOP) into effect. The prescribed evacuation safe haven was
MacDill Air Force Base (AFB) in Tampa, Florida. This decision was not taken
lightly, as the main thrust of the region strategic C2 takes place in HQ, where the
infrastructure is in place. However, considering all the factors—Florida’s governor directing mandatory departure from parts of the county in which Region 9
HQ is located and some Region 9 HQ Marines live, the Florida Regional Center
(the physical location of Region 9 HQ) officially closing, and a category 5 hurricane bearing down directly on the location—the order was sensible, logical,
timely, and prudent.2 Bottom line: it was the right thing to do.
Marines are taught to adapt and overcome to accomplish the mission. The
execution of the COOP at MacDill was a true testament to that ethos. However,
Region 9 HQ would be tested again. After Region 9 HQ spent thirty-six hours
conducting operations from the safe haven, the unpredictable hurricane curved
westward around southern Florida, now severely threatening the Tampa coastline. At this juncture, the commanding general of MacDill AFB ordered the
evacuation of all residents and guests. By all analyses, this was an astute decision,
as Hurricane Irma’s new course endangered thousands. Reacting to this new
chain of events, Region 9 HQ developed courses of action in a hasty planning
process, then settled on a dispersion of forces to various safe locations throughout South Carolina, Georgia, and northern Florida.3 The resultant split-forces
operations required detailed coordination and a particularized communications
plan (discussed later).
This theme of safety applied not only to the Marines of Region 9 but also to
their families. Where authorized departures were activated at the embassies, Region 9 HQ encouraged detachment commanders to send families out of harm’s
way and helped coordinate logistical and administrative efforts to ensure a
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smooth process. Similarly, when Region 9 HQ decided to put the departure order
into effect, safety of the families was a critical factor. All courses of action hinged
on the safety of the activity or preparation, whether that involved ensuring that
Marines had approved safe relocation sites; planned travel itineraries (via flying
or driving); or adequate food, water, other emergency provisions, and rest. Getting the Region 9 family as a whole into the safest position possible to weather
the hurricane allowed the Marines to continue to carry out their duties effectively,
even when facing the dilemmas resulting from operating amid multiple natural
disasters.
Communication
Safe operational courses of action are successful only when a sustainable and
reliable communication structure allows a free flow of information. One of the
tenets of the Region 9 commanding officer’s (CO’s) command philosophy is that
effective communication entails ensuring that information is conveyed to all who
need to know it in a timely manner. During Hurricane Irma, operations involved
keeping a communication gateway among the affected detachments, Region 9
HQ, and other MCESG HQs. A preestablished communication plan enabled constant information flow throughout each event during this period of the “perfect
storm.” For example, when the earthquake off the coast of Mexico threatened to
produce devastating tsunamis and aftershocks that would impact Guatemala,
Mexico, and El Salvador, the Region 9 CO, MCESG, and the detachments communicated up-to-the-minute status reports on Marines’ welfare, embassy damage, and local weather.
These entities used a highly effective push-and-pull system of information
gathering/producing that was effectuated by multiple media, including e-mail;
web-based applications; and cell phone text and voice functions, as well as applications (specifically, WhatsApp). An open, flat communication structure
within which all parties were privy to real-time information dispensed with any
communication lag, enabling those who required critical information to make
efficient and knowledgeable decisions. For example, Region 9 HQ was able to
produce multiple daily situation reports for MCESG HQ that offered insight on
the overall status of the command and where the focus of attention needed to be
as Hurricane Irma navigated through the region’s area of responsibility. Often
these reports were completed via e-mail; however, when communication media
did not work because of weather, other forms were employed as well.
In contingency operations communication is never perfect; this was true during the Hurricane Irma event. Use of cell phones and the Internet during and
after the hurricane proved to be troublesome, not only because of connectivity
issues but also because almost the entire state of Florida and the Caribbean lost
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electrical service for various periods. Conserving resources was key to allowing
communications to continue to flow in an effective manner.
Instituting a multimedia communication structure provided significant insurance against a total communication breakdown across the vast region. However,
Region 9 HQ prepared for any anomaly by designating a special Hurricane Irma
liaison officer who would assume the position of the Region 9 HQ and act as
an intermediary between the detachments and MCESG HQ. The Region 9 CO
appointed the Ottawa (Canada) detachment commander to this liaison position
and established a protocol that provided set timelines, so if all communication
from Region 9 HQ was lost the liaison officer automatically would follow a prescribed plan. This “fallback” provision proved extremely beneficial. The liaison
officer relayed information to detachments and MCESG, but more importantly
provided stability within the region while the HQ element went through multiple
evacuations and natural catastrophes. For example, when the tornadoes ripped
through central Florida and temporarily cut off cell phone and Internet service,
the liaison officer was able to keep up a continuous stream of communication
with the detachments, providing assessments of embassy damage.
Accountability
Perhaps the most critical use of effective communication was to account for
personnel and equipment. During Hurricane Irma, judicious and steadfast
communicative processes enabled all detachments and HQ Marines to submit
morning reports with 100 percent accountability, providing higher HQs with
an assurance that all personnel were accounted for, uninjured, and safe. Region
9 HQ mandated that all personnel report in each morning; prior to, during, and
on completion of any prolonged movement; and when any commander-critical
information requirements specific to the hurricane were triggered (e.g., injury
or power outage). Prior to the hurricane’s arrival, all the detachments reported
accountability via the Internet. However, as the storm traversed the region and
destroyed electrical power grids and paralyzed Internet access, detachments
switched to other methods, including cell phones. For example, Cuba lost power
for more than a week owing to wind damage and the flooding of the embassy, but
the detachment used cell phones effectively to provide morning and situational
reports to Region 9 HQ. Similarly, when Region 9 HQ was forced to conduct
operations from separate physical locations after the second evacuation, it conducted internal accountability through the WhatsApp cell phone application,
providing a flat-line communication method that allowed instantaneous distribution of information to all.
Ensuring the whereabouts, condition, and safety of Marines and unit equipment is the core of C2. Accountability comes as second nature to Marine
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commanders—but it may not be truly tested until lives are at risk. MSG command naturally embodies a strong accountability requirement, given that regions’
detachments are dispersed throughout broad areas of the world; however, risk to
life and limb is not always present.4 Accountability becomes even more vital when
the lives of family members and friends accompanying Marines are entrusted to
the Marine Corps family. Hurricane Irma and its accompanying natural disasters
tested Region 9’s accountability procedures. Throughout the storms, Region 9
accounted for all its detachment Marines and families; this included the Region
9 HQ staff, family, and accompanying friends through two evacuations and hundreds of miles of travel.
Accountability cannot be taken for granted or assumed at any time, but especially during times of peril. Accurate accountability allows for the timely mitigation of issues and quicker resolution of problems that might fester without due
attention. As noted, during the hurricane, Region 9 conducted accountability
procedures in response to multiple triggers. This enabled the command and
higher HQ to have full faith and confidence that all Marines and family members were uninjured and in safe locations. Because of the distances traveled and
shortages of fuel, accountability was fundamental when Region 9 HQ Marines
dispersed from Tampa to their various safe havens.
Command and control within the Region 9 HQ staff and the MSG detachments during Hurricane Irma and the other natural disasters focused on safety,
communication, and accountability. The interplay among these three elements
highlighted the importance of establishing mechanisms to facilitate internal and
external coordination. Ensuring the well-being of Marines and families when life
and limb are at risk is paramount to leadership, and it was the priority in this case.
Constant, effective communication that provided up-to-date information to and
from all affected units and individuals established positive control and instilled
confidence in command capabilities. Employing multiple media mechanisms
safeguarded against potential communication breakdowns that would have
crippled administrative and operational movements. Accountability of Marines
and equipment was a core concept of control and ensured timely and accurate
reporting. The unpredictable and challenging scenarios encountered during the
“perfect storm” truly tested the tenets of command and control.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/9

Winter2018Review.indb 145

6

11/1/17 9:56 AM

146

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Galvin: Commentary

NOTES

1.	Joshua Berlinger, Mariano Castillo, and Ray
Sanchez, “Mexico’s Strongest Earthquake in a
Century Leaves Dozens Dead,” CNN, September 9, 2017, www.cnn.com/.
2.	Governor Rick Scott issued partial mandatory
evacuations for sixteen counties and directed
voluntary evacuations for thirteen other
counties. Sarah Almukhtar et al., “Maps:
Tracking Hurricane Irma’s Path over Florida,”
New York Times, September 11, 2017, www
.nytimes.com/.
3.	Maintaining a regional HQ in one location
and still accomplishing the mission was
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deemed impossible because no lodging was
available within approximately five hundred miles of Tampa. The course of action
employed was for Region 9 HQ staff to stay
with friends and family within the (relatively)
immediate area of northern Florida, Georgia,
and South Carolina.
4.	For some detachments, the threat of death or
serious bodily injury is a daily peril (e.g., in
Afghanistan). The hazards associated with a
hurricane or other natural disasters do not
compare to man-made threats; the point is
that the dangers vary.
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